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Abstract 
Trade in food and agricultural products accounts for a 
major part of global trade, and the trade continues to alert domestic 
consumers to the risks associated with modern food processing and 
production methods.  The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP), now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), represents a new 
model of mega-regional trade pacts posed to set higher standards 
for promoting and streamlining trade liberalization.  Because of 
concerns with national food safety regulations that could constitute 
forms of non-tariff barriers, the CPTPP, in contrast to the World 
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Trade Organization (WTO), stipulates further rules on parties’ 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), achieving a type of role 
model of SPS-plus.   
This article explores the legal implications and 
progressiveness of the SPS-plus design, particularly focusing on the 
requirements of scientific evidence and risk analysis.  The 
SPS-plus that sets hurdles for national regulatory regimes largely 
reflects WTO jurisprudence, international health standards, and the 
national regulations of the United States.  I argue that the role 
model may provide momentum to modernize parties’ food safety 
regimes, but the cost of full compliance could be high.  Genuine 
collaboration, experience-sharing, and technological and financial 
support between developed countries and less developed countries 
may alleviate the difficulties of implementation and promote 
coherence. 
Key words: CPTPP, SPS-Plus, Food Safety, Science, Risk Analysis 
I.  Introduction 
Food trade accounts for a major part of global trade, and 
domestic consumers are increasingly wary of the safety of imported 
foods.  Although food trade can ensure food security for countries 
that cannot sustain themselves, it may also engender risks that 
originate from modern food processing and production methods.  
Therefore, national food authorities are expected to manage food 
risks cautiously.  Risk analysis consists of three components, 
namely risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, 
which has become an important mechanism of risk control.    
The incorporation of risk analysis in food regulations has 
succeeded at global and local levels in ensuring food safety.  The 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), a World Health 
Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
subsidiary, is the leading international food safety institution.  The 
CAC not only engages in risk analysis in setting international food 
standards, but also promotes the implementation of risk analysis 
within national regimes.1  The WHO and the FAO have jointly 
produced a guidance document to help national authorities establish 
food safety risk analysis regimes.2  Nonetheless, the document, 
 
1 CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N., WORKING PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ANALYSIS FOR 
FOOD SAFETY FOR APPLICATION BY GOVERNMENTS 2–9 (2007), http://www.fao.org/ 
3/a-a1550t.pdf. 
2 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FOOD SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS: 
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although useful in this regard, is implemented on a voluntary basis.  
The European General Food Law represents a clear model of the 
full incorporation of risk analysis in governing food safety,3 and 
the Food Safety Basic Law of Japan also recognizes the 
indispensable role of risk analysis in ensuring consumers’ 
confidence in food safety.4     
Concerned with the impact of national regulations on 
imported foods, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) requires members to adopt risk-based decision-making 
and especially to link trade measures to risk assessment. 5  
However, the drafters of the SPS Agreement did not intend to 
oblige members to build a thorough risk analysis system into their 
regulations, despite certain provisions partially reflecting such 
ideas. 6 Since the WTO Doha Round was in dilemma, trading 
parties have turned their efforts to negotiating regional trade 
agreements (RTAs).  To further promote the international flow of 
agricultural products without unjustified intervention, certain 
SPS-plus disciplines have been pursued.7  In contrast to the SPS 
Agreement, most SPS-plus arrangements have emphasized 
cooperation and effective coordination between parties. 8  
Nonetheless, most of the agreements have shown little interest in 
pushing for the establishment of an advanced system for risk-based 
regimes beyond that of the WTO’s original mechanism.9  
 
 
A GUIDE FOR NATIONAL SAFETY AUTHORITIES xi–xii (2006), http://www.fao.org/do 
crep/012/a0822e/a0822e00.htm [hereinafter FAO & WHO GUIDE]. 
3 Risk Analysis constitutes one of the general principles of European food law of 
which definition has clearly been provided. See 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1–8 (defining 
Risk Analysis as one of the general principles of European food law) [hereinafter 
European General Food Law]. 
4 FOOD SAFETY COMM’N. OF JAPAN, JAPAN FOOD SAFETY BASIC LAW (2010), 
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf. 
5 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, arts. 
5.1–5.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
6 Id. arts. 5.5–5.6. 
7 See Part II of this Article and corresponding footnotes. 
8 See e.g., The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and Canada, entered into force provisionally on September 21, 
2017, art. 5.4, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapt 
er/ [hereinafter CETA]; see also, The Economic Partnership Agreement between 
the European Union and Japan, signed on July 17, 2018, entered into force on 
February 1, 2019, art. 6, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-econom 
ic-partnership-agreement/ [hereinafter Economic Partnership Agreement]. 
9 See id. 
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The finalization of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP) involved many stages of negotiations and partners.  It began 
with plurilateral talks of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.10  
Subsequently, more Asia-Pacific countries expressed interest in 
joining the trade block.  In particular, the United States’ (U.S.) 
determination to lead and set the agenda for the mega-regional trade 
arrangement made the TPP the most ambitious and unprecedented 
RTA in both economic strength and standards. 11   The TPP 
concluded in 2015 represented a new model of mega-free-trade 
pacts and was posed to set higher standards for promoting and 
streamlining trade liberalization, 12  and to espouse significant 
values beyond trade and commerce concerns.13  
Since the Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the 
TPP in early 2017, the remaining 11 parties have endeavored to 
keep the agreement alive.  During the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Ministerial Meeting held in Da Nang, Vietnam, on November 11, 
2017, the TPP-11 countries in the Pacific region—New Zealand, 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—reached a consensus that 
the TPP would be temporarily replaced by the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).14  
 
10  See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4), NEW ZEALAND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreeme 
nts/free-trade-agreements-in-force/p4/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (discussing the 
timeline of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership which was signed in 
2005 and entered into force in 2006); see also, The Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership (P4), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-f 
orce/P4/Full-text-of-P4-agreement.pdf. 
11 See RAHEL AICHELE & GABRIEL FELBERMAYR, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
DEAL (TPP): WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IN- AND OUTSIDERS? 4 
(2015), http://ged-project.de/2015/10/09/who-wins-and-who-loses-with-tpp/. 
12  But cf., Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements, (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2019) (indexing the voluminous list of individual trade agreements 
between the U.S. and other nations).  
13  See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Notification of 
Completion of Domestic Procedures for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001443.h 
tml (“It also seeks to deepen and broaden economic ties among countries and 
regions that share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, basic human 
rights, and the rule of law, and is hence strategically significant in terms of 
pursuing further regional stability.”).  
14 See Press Release from Minister Taro Kono, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, Agreement at the Ministerial Level on the TPP Negotiations Among 11 
Countries (Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001788.ht 
ml. 
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The CPTPP was signed in Chile on March 8, 2018.15  The free 
trade pact would become effective 60 days after at least six (or 50%) 
of the signatories notified the Depositary (New Zealand) of the 
completion of ratification procedures.16  As of October 30, 2018, 
six countries (Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
Singapore) have ratified the agreement. Therefore, the CPTPP 
entered into force on December 30, 2018.17  
Several original commitments of the TPP, including 
intellectual property and investment Chapters, have been suspended, 
but the SPS Chapter remains unchanged.  Due to concerns that 
national food safety regulations could constitute a form of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), the CPTPP, in contrast to the WTO, adds further 
requirements to parties’ SPS measures, referred to as SPS-plus.18  
In particular, the CPTPP SPS Chapter explicitly requires risk 
analysis and provides definitions for its components.19  In contrast 
to recent SPS-plus developments in other RTAs and free trade 
agreements (FTAs), the CPTPP’s SPS approach appears unique and 
ambitious.  The effort to push the incorporation of the risk regime 
into parties’ regulatory regimes is a progressive agenda that 
presents both opportunities and challenges for national compliance.   
This article explores the legal implications of the 
progressive design of the SPS-plus model and assesses its impact, 
particularly focusing on the requirements of scientific evidence and 
a risk analysis regime.  The difficulty for national regulatory 
regimes to fulfill such high SPS standards seems apparent, but the 
mandate may provide an opportunity to modernize national food 
safety governance that has thus far been subject to political and 
non-science-based considerations.  Part II introduces the 
development of SPS-plus in RTAs.  Part III of this article analyzes 
the CPTPP’s approach to applying a risk analysis mechanism, 
 
15 See Dave Sherwood & Felipe Iturrieta, Asia-Pacific Nations Sign Sweeping 
Trade Deal Without U.S., THOMPSON REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018, 12:12 AM) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/asia-pacific-nations-sign-sweeping-tra
de-deal-without-u-s-idUSKCN1GK0JM.  
16 See id. 
17 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
N.Z. FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agre 
ements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/cptpp-overview/ (last visited Oct. 26, 
2019) (discussing the origins of the CPTPP and ratification process). 
18 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
signed on March 8, 2018, entered into force on December 30, 2018, ch. 7, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/7.-Sanitary-and-Ph
ytosanitary-Measures-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP]. 
19 Id. arts. 7.1, 7.9. 
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describes the discrepancy between the WTO contexts and those of 
the SPS-plus, and explores the implications of the obligations 
imposed on the parties.  Part IV discusses the challenges facing 
the parties in implementing the added requirements.  Part V 
concludes that the significance and challenges of applying the 
SPS-plus standards for improving national food risk regulatory 
regimes are considerable.  All parties to the new model of RTA 
should work in good faith to make the arrangement beneficial to all 
stakeholders. 
II.  Developments of SPS-Plus in RTAs 
The impasses of the WTO Doha agenda pushed trading 
parties to pursue further trade liberalization by negotiating RTAs 
and FTAs.20  The aims of the free trade zones include, inter alia, 
tariff reduction, trade facilitation, NTB elimination, regulatory 
cooperation, and anti-corruption and environmental protection 
provisions. 21   These objectives exceed the original WTO 
commitments, namely WTO-plus.22     
When trade partners have pursued WTO-plus at regional 
and bilateral levels, the premise of SPS-plus has also been included 
in the negotiations.23  During the past decade, many RTAs/FTAs 
have been concerned with increasing NTBs and non-tariff measures 
(NTMs). 24  Several reasons have made the move increasingly 
urgent.  Public health concerns, particularly for the risks brought 
by imported agricultural products, have increasingly attracted the 
attention of national consumers, prompting nations to increase the 
level of protection concerning health and environmental safety and 
tighten their regulations.25  Regulation of imported foods has been 
enhanced by requiring more inspections and sophisticated 
certifications.  These alleged NTBs or NTMs, many of which have 
not been entirely science-based or rule-based, have alarmed 
countries, particularly exporting countries.26 Such countries have 
 
20  MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24–25 (3rd ed. 2016). 
21  International Free Trade Zone, ECONOMY WATCH (May 25, 2010), 
https://www.economywatch.com/international-trade/free-trade-zone.html. 
22 See Ken Ash and Iza Lejarraga, Can We Have Regionalism and Multilateralism? 
in TACKLING AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT 75–78 (Ricardo 
Melédez-Ortiz et al., eds., 2014). 
23 Id. at 77. 
24  United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES: 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 (2018), 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2018d3_en.pdf.  
25 Id. at 85, 115. 
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN 
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argued that SPS-plus should be constructed to prevent the abuse of 
such measures or the implementation of disguised protectionist 
policies.27 
In negotiations of SPS-plus arrangements, parties have 
pursued some common goals, such as the further elaboration of 
thorough scientific principles and risk analysis to support and 
justify food regulations, elimination of unnecessary 
non-science-based measures, and expansion of the width and depth 
of information sharing, including transparency requirements.28  In 
particular, to facilitate food trade, cooperation and consultation 
mechanisms have been enhanced. 29  The relevant texts of the 
CPTPP, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between the European Union (EU) and Canada (CETA), and the 
EU-Japan Economic Partner Agreement (EPA) reflect similar 
approaches with minor distinctions. 30   In general, these 
developments derived from a gradual consensus-building among 
WTO members.  Scholars have observed that “many SPS-plus 
measures found in RTAs are already enshrined in the voluntary 
guidelines of the WTO SPS Committee on how to implement the 
WTO SPS Agreement.”31  The mutuality and interdependence of 
the agreements can help achieve the convergence of regional 
SPS-plus approaches and multilateral developments.  The progress 
in RTAs thus, as observed, may be expected to promote the 
multilateralization of such RTA-plus measures.32  
 
 
 
 
 
ASEAN 2, 125 (Lili Yan Ing et al. eds., April 2016), https://unctad.org/en/Publicati 
onsLibrary/ERIA-UNCTAD_Non-Tariff_Measures_in_ASEAN_en.pdf. 
27 Naoto Jinji, An Economic Theory of the SPS Agreement, THE RESEARCH INST. 
OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. 1, 3, https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e03 
3.pdf. 
28RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RES. SERV., R43450, SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
(SPS) AND RELATED NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE 11-12 (2014);  
see also, CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic Partnership Agreement, supra 
note 8, chs. 6–7. 
29 Markus Wagner, The Future of SPS Governance: SPS-Plus or SPS-Minus? 51 J. 
WORLD TRADE 445, 461 (2017). 
30 CPTPP, supra note 18, chs. 7–8; CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic 
Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, chs. 6–7. 
31 Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 77. 
32 See id. at 76, 81. 
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III.  Scientific Principles and Risk Analysis in 
CPTPP/SPS-Plus 
A.  Overall Approach of the SPS Chapter of CPTPP 
 
The U.S. was influential in shaping SPS-plus regarding 
scientific principles and risk analysis during original TPP 
negotiations.  The proposal of the Office of the United States 
Trade Representatives (USTR) transcended the existing rules under 
the WTO and prior U.S. bilateral/regional trade deals.  For 
example, the USTR intended to clarify the elements of risk 
assessment that were considered to be inadequately elaborated33 in 
the text of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.  The USTR’s 
proposal was premised on the concern shared by many exporters 
that some WTO members adopted import restrictions based on 
flawed or even nonexistent risk assessments, and, consequently, an 
“adequate” risk assessment must be further defined. 34  
Considering its tensions with several countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.) regarding certain food safety 
controversies since 2011, the U.S. anticipated crafting the TPP/SPS 
Chapter as a mega-regional template for future application.35  The 
negotiators consolidated the various SPS proposals into a single 
text at the ninth round in Chicago, including key elements such as a 
timeline for risk assessment, enhanced process transparency, and a 
more specific definition of “sound science.”36 
 
Subsequently, U.S. agri-food groups started to jointly and 
publicly make their appeals at the twelth TPP negotiation round in 
Dallas.37  Several recommendations aimed at revamping existing 
SPS rules were proposed, including an elaborate set of risk 
assessment and risk management requirements, enhanced 
transparency (notification and explanation of new measures and a 
reasonable length of time for public comments on draft measures), 
and an emphasis on international standards and harmonization.38  
These recommendations played a vital role in the subsequent 
 
33 USTR May Offer Revised SPS Proposal in TPP, Aims to Go Beyond WTO, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 22, 2011), https://wtonewsstand.com/content/ustr-may-off 
er-revised-sps-proposal-tpp-aims-go-beyond-wto. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 U.S. Tables Revised SPS Chapter, TPP Round Produces Consolidated Text, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sep. 16, 2011), ProQuest Central, Document ID: 911969547. 
37 Agriculture, Food Industry Seek WTO-Plus Rules for TPP Chapter, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (May 18, 2012), ProQuest Central, Document ID:1014125823. 
38 Id. 
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rounds of negotiations. 
 
The risk analysis mechanism has been adopted by several 
international institutions that govern food safety, such as the CAC39 
and the 2001 Biosafety Protocol. 40   Some national and 
supranational regulatory regimes have also applied and practiced 
this model, including the EU41 and Japan.42  
 
The WTO SPS Agreement requires compliance with 
science-based and risk-based principles for adopting national SPS 
measures.43  However, the agreement only explicitly mentions the 
idea of risk assessment and does not specify the terms of risk 
management and risk communication. 44   The Panel in EC–
Hormones explained the essence of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement 
by covering elements of both risk assessment and risk 
management.45  The broad approach to align the coverage with the 
general understanding, however, was rejected by the Appellate 
Body simply because such a wording of risk management did not 
explicitly appear in the context.46  
 
Regulatory cooperation has constituted one of the major 
goals of current RTA/FTA negotiations.47  Such a mandate is also 
 
39 See Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] & World Health Organization 
[WHO], Codex Alimentarius Comm’n: Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, app. IV, 
Ref. No. ALINORM 03/41 (June 30 – July 7, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/00 
6/Y4800E/y4800e0o.htm#bm24 (containing the working principles that guide the 
work of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies regarding risk analysis). 
40  See Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, arts. 15–16, annex III, adopted Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, 
(entered into force Sept. 11, 2003).  
41 The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6. 
42 According to Japan Food Safety Basic Act, “a new concept of ’risk analysis’ 
was introduced to promote food safety in a more comprehensive manner. See 
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf (last visited Oct. 
10, 2018). 
43 SPS Agreement, supra note 5. 
44 See id. (discussing only risk assessment, without mention of risk management 
or risk communication). 
45 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS48/R/CAN, ¶¶ 8.94–8.95, 8.98 (Aug. 18, 
1997) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC – Hormones]. 
46 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, ¶ 
181 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones]. 
47 See Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 64-65 (2016) (illustrating a number of RTA/FTA practices in enhancing 
regulatory cooperation, particularly on SPS matters); see generally Eugenia 
Costanza Laurenza & Fabienne Goyeneche, Regulatory Cooperation in Free Trade 
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commonly required in many SPS Chapters of trade agreements.  
For example, CETA reflects the trend.48  The EPA also highlights 
the significance of cooperation for easing possible health-related 
regulatory disagreements. 49   Both agreements, despite being 
negotiated by parties of developed countries, failed to elaborate a 
risk regime beyond the original WTO/SPS design in the end. The 
EPA—irrespective of its ambition to consolidate risk analysis, as 
evidenced in an early EU assessment report50—has turned out to be 
a simple repetition of the WTO legacy.51  
    
By contrast, the CPTPP SPS Chapter has unequivocally 
specified the requirement for risk analysis.52  It is the first attempt 
at incorporating a relatively sound risk-based and science-based 
mechanism into a regional trade regime.53  The unprecedented 
approach is a clear indication of the original vision of the U.S. in 
seeking the codification of high standards into SPS-plus.  The 
effort also represents a progressive development in the WTO/SPS 
arrangement.   
 
The U.S. has withdrawn itself from the TPP, but the 
approach originally proposed by the U.S. continues to impact on its 
current RTA negotiations.  The North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada has 
been renegotiated since the Trump administration came into 
office.54  This RTA has been replaced by the newly-concluded 
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). 55   Some 
 
Agreements: Perspectives from the Automotive and Information and 
Communication Technology Sectors, 12 GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J. 433 (2017) 
(discussing the forms of regulatory cooperation and their use in modern free trade 
agreements, particularly in the automotive industry and information and 
communication technology sectors). 
48 CETA, supra note 8, arts. 21.1– 21.2. 
49 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, art. 6.1.  
50 See LSE ENTER., TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN 59–60 (2015). 
51 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 6.4, 6.6 (reiterating 
the mandate of the WTO SPS Agreement on risk assessment). 
52 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9. 
53 Because the U.S and other countries have a strong comparative advantage in 
agricultural production, they consider import restrictions should meet more 
reasonable and sound scientific tests to avoid NTBs. See notes 33–37 and 
accompanying text.   
54  The USMCA was concluded on Sep. 30, 2018. See Alan Rappeport, A 
Last-Minute Deal With Canada Salvages a Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2018, at A1 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/politics/us-canada-nafta-deal- 
deadline.html (last visited October 31, 2018). 
55 Id.  
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changes in the new trade deal originated from the TPP per se.56  In 
terms of the SPS rules, the USMCA maintains a large portion of the 
TPP ingredients.57  The provision concerning “science and risk 
analysis” generally mirrors that of the TPP/SPS with minor 
modifications.58 
 
B.  Implications and Progress of Risk Analysis in the 
CPTPP/SPS Chapter 
 
i.  General Idea of Risk Analysis in the CPTPP 
 
The CPTPP’s definition of risk analysis 59  reflects the 
common usage appearing at international, regional, and national 
levels.60  In particular, it increases the requirements for the format 
of risk analysis and public involvement in the process by requiring 
that the operation of the system be documented and opportunities 
for public comment be provided to interested persons or parties.61  
To clarify the application, the SPS Chapter specifies that such 
requirements apply only to a risk analysis for a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure that constitutes a sanitary or phytosanitary 
regulation for the purposes of Annex B of the SPS Agreement 
(transparency).62  
 
In the pursuit of harmonization, the WTO/SPS Agreement 
expects members to apply international standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations and extends certain incentives, 63  but such 
international standards are not binding on WTO members per se.64  
 
56 See Justin Worland, Trump’s NAFTA Replacement Largely Maintains Status 
Quo on Free Trade, TIME (Oct. 1, 2018), https://time.com/5411444/nafta-trump-de 
al-usmca/. 
57 Id. 
58 In contrast to the CPTPP, the new agreement replaces risk analysis with risk 
assessment and risk management, although the title of the provision remains 
unchanged.  The move may indicate the USMCA’s intent to reduce the mandate 
of risk communication.  Agreement between the United States of America, the 
United Mexican States, and Canada art. 9.6, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Nov. 30, 2018; see 
also CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.1.   
59 Id. art. 7.1. 
60 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7; see also European General Food Law, 
supra note 3, art. 3, paras. 11-13. 
61 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9. 
62 Id. footnote 4 to art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b). 
63 Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that national SPS measures that 
conform to international standards enjoy the presumption of consistency with the 
SPS Agreement. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, at 2.  
64 Observing the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence has led to the conclusion that 
“[t]he Appellate Body’s interpretation . . . has turned the course of subsequent SPS 
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The WTO case law has not fully recognized a principle of 
deference to certain international standards and their setting.  In 
Hormones II, the Appellate Body departed from international 
standard-setting in two main aspects.  First, the Appellate Body 
opined that experts involved in standard-setting may lack 
independence and not be suitable to provide objective opinions, 
especially if they were not in agreement with members who sought 
a higher level of protection than that of an international regime.65  
Second, it also rejected the idea that an existing international 
standard can justify the sufficiency of scientific evidence that may 
disqualify a provisional measure.66 
 
By contrast, the TPP negotiators managed to bring the SPS 
Chapter closer to international standard-setting and demonstrated 
an intent to further the mandate of harmonization by, inter alia, 
including the encouragement of “the development and adoption of 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations” and the 
promotion of “their implementation by the Parties” as one of the 
objectives of the SPS Chapter.67  The text was aimed at making 
enforceable the relevant international arrangements on risk analysis 
that are usually voluntary.  As the WTO/SPS Committee and other 
international standard-setting regimes, including the WHO and 
FAO, have provided useful references for building a risk analysis 
regime, the CPTPP parties are required to take into account their 
works in designing their regulations.68  In effect, the CPTPP SPS 
Chapter bluntly reinforces the relevance of international soft law 
with the establishment of a national risk analysis regime. 
 
 
 
jurisprudence away from the assessment of national SPS measures against 
international benchmark standards.” See JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK 
REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 178–81(2010). 
65 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in 
the EC – Hormones Dispute, ¶ 481, WTO Doc. WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16, 
2008) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension]; see also 
KUEI-JUNG NI, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety 
Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response of WTO Adjudication to 
Problematic International Standard-Making, 68 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 97, 111–13 
(2013) (observing the tendency of the Appellate Body of not entirely endorsing 
international standard-setting). 
66 The Appellate Body also denied that an existing international standard can 
entail and prove sufficiency of scientific evidence in order to disqualify a 
provisional measure. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension, supra 
note 65, ¶¶ 695,733. 
67 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.2, ¶ (f). 
68 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a). 
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ii.  Scientific Principles and Risk Assessment 
 
The SPS Chapter does not provide a new definition of risk 
assessment as the WTO/SPS Agreement has defined the term 
clearly.69  To justify the results of a risk assessment and gain 
public confidence, many national practices have adhered to certain 
core values and principles when completing the assessment.  For 
example, the European General Food Law specifies that “[r]isk 
assessment shall be based on the available scientific evidence and 
undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner.”70  
The Japan Food Safety Basic Law71 details similar requirements.72  
 
The WTO/SPS Agreement has yet to add further mandates 
such as those of the EU and Japan.  In addition to requiring a 
science-based approach to risk assessment, it may be desirable for 
the SPS Chapter to incorporate objectives compatible with higher 
values such as democracy and fairness.  The CPTPP context has 
not explicitly recognized the principles of independence and 
transparency.  However, as mentioned, the CPTPP parties shall 
take into account international standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations in the execution of risk analysis.73  Thus, the 
WHO and FAO’s guidance that recognizes the characteristics of 
objectivity and transparency in risk assessment74 may help shape 
the progress of national risk analysis regimes, although it is of a 
less obligatory nature.  
 
Article 2.2 of the WTO/SPS Agreement specifies the 
science-based principle as one of its controlling mandates. 75  
According to Article 5.1 of the Agreement, WTO members shall 
base their trade measures on an assessment of risks.76  In the 
assessment of risks, they are required to take into account 
“available” scientific evidence. 77   In EC—Hormones, the 
Appellate Body stated that these two provisions should be read 
together. 78   The difference between the WTO/SPS and the 
 
69 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4.  
70 The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6, ¶ (2) (emphasis added). 
71 Japan Food Safety Basic Act, Act No. 48, arts. 13(emphasis added) of May 23, 
2003, http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/basic_act/fs_basic_act.pdf. 
72 Id. arts. 13, 32. 
73 CPTPP, supra note 18, art.7.9, ¶ 6 (a) (emphasis added). 
74 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 48, 49. 
75 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2. 
76 Id. art. 5.1. 
77 Id. art. 5.2. 
78 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶¶ 177, 180. 
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CPTPP/SPS context lies in the benchmark that they set for the 
eligibility of scientific evidence.  The main addition of the 
SPS-plus in this regard is a focus on making the scientific approach 
more stringent.  A careful reading of the SPS Chapter suggests that 
it adds criteria of what constitutes “sound science” as opposed to 
“junk science.”  
 
First, regarding the quality of scientific evidence, the SPS 
Agreement does not classify the type of science that can satisfy the 
requirement to support a given measure. 79   However, WTO 
jurisprudence appears to value the significance of scientific 
robustness. 80   In US/Canada—Continued Suspension, the 
Appellate Body stated that the standard of review exercised by a 
Panel on a party’s risk assessment should involve examining 
“whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning 
and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively 
justifiable.”81  Thus, such science should be examined by a test of 
whether it “comes from a respected and qualified source” and 
meets “the necessary scientific and methodological rigor.”82  The 
SPS Chapter adds an element by emphasizing the “objectiveness” 
of the science to justify an SPS measure in question.83  The further 
elaboration and incorporation of the WTO’s judicial rulings on 
qualified science by the CPTPP tighten the admissibility of science 
for legitimate use in risk assessment.  Indeed, the reinforced 
threshold of requiring legitimate science squarely fulfills the 
original objective of the TPP negotiations to pursue high standards.   
 
Second, with respect to the form of the scientific evidence 
in question, neither the WTO/SPS context nor its case law requires 
any certain format.  The CPTPP Chapter states that such scientific 
evidence must be documented. 84   This requirement raises the 
threshold of compliance.  Nevertheless, given the lack of a clear 
definition of documentation, it remains unclear how stringent the 
element should be.  An argument that scientific evidence must be 
published in journals could be too restrictive, given many studies 
and surveys have yet to be published.85  
 
79 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.2. 
80 See PEEL, supra note 64, at 190–230 (discussing the WTO’s treatment of 
scientific principles). 
81 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 590. 
82 Id. ¶ 591. 
83 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2. 
84 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b). 
85  FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, Box 3.9, at 50 (noting that certain 
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Third, regarding the scope of scientific evidence, the 
WTO/SPS Agreement simply provides that members are required to 
apply scientific evidence that is available to them.86  Given that 
countries possess various levels of scientific and technological 
development, the alleged “availability” of the evidence in question 
may differ.  The negotiators of the CPTPP SPS Chapter would 
likely not be satisfied with the WTO mandate because this approach 
may, to some extent, exempt members from using the best science 
that exists worldwide but may not be available in the country under 
complaint.  The SPS Chapter limits the scope of the science in 
question.  It first states that the availability of science to parties 
shall be “reasonably” available.87  The additional requirement of 
reasonableness may impose burdens on parties to perform more 
searches and surveys for further evidence if to do so would be 
reasonable.  Moreover, parties are required to take into account 
data that is “relevant.” 88   Thus, the limitation could further 
constrain nations’ discretion in data collection.   
 
On the other hand, the CPTPP’s approach is also a 
manifestation of the incorporation of the WTO case law.  In EC— 
Hormones, the Appellate Body ruled that the methodology for 
performing scientific risk assessment is not limited to the usual 
model of quantitative usage, as a qualitative approach would also 
be acceptable.89  Thus, the SPS Chapter aligns with the approach 
by explicitly covering these two methods.90  
  
As expected, the justification for formulating a relatively 
rigid mandate for the quality of science is not without objections or 
open questions.  The introduction of the idea of “documented and 
objective science” could narrow down the flexibility of parties to 
select and apply applicable science.  Concerns have been 
expressed regarding whether the flexibility of using “minority 
 
information and data produced by industry may not be published, which 
nevertheless can be relied on for risk assessment). 
86 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.2, 5.7.  
87 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5. 
88 Id. 
89 The broad understanding was also confirmed by the subsequent rulings.  See 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, ¶ 124 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon]; Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension, 
supra note 65, ¶ 530; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R, ¶ 208 
(Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples].  
90 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5. 
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science” as recognized by WTO jurisprudence could be undermined 
by the rigid approach. 91   According to the Appellate Body’s 
rulings, WTO members are permitted to use minority views of the 
scientific community as the basis for decision-making as long as 
such views originated from qualified and respected sources.92  The 
question thus becomes whether a minority opinion that, despite 
being reputable, was not formally published or is just the result of 
“a small number of peer-reviewed studies”93 could be permissive 
under the high standard.  This may depend on the interpretations 
of “documentation” for science. 
 
iii.  Risk Management 
 
As mentioned, risk management is not explicitly 
recognized in the WTO/SPS Agreement. 94   Nevertheless, the 
Agreement reflects certain elements of risk management in the 
allocation of the rights and obligations of WTO members.95  For 
example, Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement recognizes the right of 
countries to decide their appropriate level of protection (ALOP),96 
which constitutes a preliminary process of risk management. 97  
The Agreement further includes the mandates of necessity and 
non-discrimination in applying SPS measures. 98   Of course, 
reflecting a precautionary principle or approach, the Agreement 
recognizes members’ discretion to adopt provisional SPS measures 
where scientific evidence is insufficient.99  
 
 
 
91 Wagner, supra note 29, at 454. 
92 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 591; Appellate 
Body Report, Australia – Apples, supra note 89, ¶ 214; Appellate Body Report, EC 
– Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 194. 
93 Wagner, supra note 29, at 454–55. 
94 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 181. 
95 E.g. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 475–76. 
96 See Australia – Salmon, supra note 89, ¶ 199.  The Appellate Body also 
considered that the SPS Agreement also implied an “obligation” of WTO members 
to disclose their ALOP precisely.  Id. ¶ 206.  The WHO and FAO Guide 
specifies that the determination of an ALOP is critical when the selection of a risk 
management option is undertaken.  See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 29–
31. 
97 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 486 (citing Appellate Body’s ruling on 
Australian Salmon). 
98 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6. 
99 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 124 (recognizing 
that Article 5.7 reflects the idea of precaution without confirming whether it is a 
principle or an approach).  
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The CPTPP/SPS Chapter continues to extend certain 
regulatory autonomy to parties relating to risk management. It 
affirms the right of parties to establish their ALOP100 and preserves 
the right to implement SPS measures on a provisional basis.101  
Concerning the obligations of parties conducting risk management, 
apart from reiterating the non-discrimination principle, the SPS 
adds, most notably, a procedural mandate requiring that risk 
management be conducted in a documented manner.   
 
The SPS Chapter defines risk management as “the 
weighing of policy alternatives in light of the results of risk 
assessment and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate 
control options, including regulatory measures.”102  This definition 
is quite similar to the general understanding of risk management 
found in the European General Food Law 103  and WHO/FAO 
documents alike.104  
 
The SPS Chapter contributes to the legalization of risk 
management by incorporating international institutions’ efforts 
relating to risk management.  For example, the WHO and FAO 
produced a guidance document for helping national food safety 
authorities to establish their risk analysis regime. 105   This 
document provides a generic four-step framework for risk 
management: (i) preliminary risk management activities; (ii) 
identification and selection of risk management options; (iii) 
implementation; and (iv) monitoring and review.106  The CPTPP 
parties are required to “take into account” such arrangements.107  
The framework remains non-binding on parties, 108  but its 
incorporation to some extent may compel the revamping of national 
regulatory structures.  Building a regime and framework not only 
requires rule-making and legislative efforts but also demands 
substantial expertise, management skills, financial resources, and 
capacity-building.  The attempt to push the modernization of risk 
 
100 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 3(a). 
101 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 3(c). 
102 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 2. 
103 European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 12. 
104 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 11, 15–35. 
107 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a) (emphasis added). 
108 See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at xii (The Guide “provides essential 
background information, guidance and practical examples of ways to apply food 
safety risk analysis.”) Since the Guide is not of treaty format, it is not binding on 
nations per se.   
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management systems is indicative of the CPTPP’s ambition to set a 
new model for RTAs.   
 
The SPS Chapter also requires parties to “consider” and 
“select” risk management options that are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to achieve their ALOP and SPS objectives.109  The 
CPTPP text seems quite similar to that of WTO/SPS 110  and 
reaffirms the principles of necessity and proportionality. 111  
Nonetheless, the arrangement literally reflects the WHO and FAO’s 
procedure for deciding among risk management options, which 
involves a dynamic process of identification, evaluation, and 
selection of risk management options.112  As mentioned, the SPS 
Chapter, like the WTO SPS Agreement, reaffirms the right of 
parties to determine their ALOP; however, both texts fail to clearly 
describe how ALOP can fairly function.  By requiring the CPTPP 
parties to consider international guidelines, the WHO and FAO’s 
arrangements may help optimize competent national regimes.   
 
When considering and selecting policy options, national 
authorities are normally expected to determine which level of 
protection is ideal and suitable for addressing specific food safety 
issues and risks.  The work of the WHO and FAO has helped to 
clarify the status of ALOP by underscoring that “[t]he concept of 
ALOP . . . is essential in establishing the linkage between risk 
management actions and the level of consumer health protection 
achieved.” 113   It also provides that “[a] range of tools or 
approaches are available to the risk manager in bridging between 
practical control measures and [the] level of consumer health 
protection.”114  With the availability of a clearer road map on 
which regulatory regimes can be based, the predictability and 
transparency of the process can be enhanced. 
 
Overall, the influence of the international guidelines over 
the establishment of national regimes cannot be overemphasized.  
The original voluntary nature of these guidelines has to some extent 
 
109 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(b),(c) (emphasis added). 
110 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.6. 
111 Id. 
112 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24–33 (“Harmonized and transparent 
application of a RMF to identify and select risk management options in different 
countries should significantly advance the goal of preventing unjustified and unfair 
restrictions in the international trading of food.”)  
113 Id. at 30. 
114 Id. 
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been hardened by the CPTPP.  However, it remains to be seen 
whether the requirements will limit the parties’ regulatory space in 
constructing their own best regimes per respective risk perceptions.  
Thus, the one-size-fits-all approach may continue to be of concern 
for its legitimacy. 
 
iv.  Risk Communication  
 
The SPS Chapter defines risk communication as “the 
exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and 
risk-related factors between risk assessors, risk managers, 
consumers and other interested parties,” which is also in line with 
the widely recognized concept.115  In contrast to its provisions on 
risk assessment and risk management, the Chapter does not provide 
any specific requirements or obligations for parties to observe in 
doing risk communication. 116  Nevertheless, as mentioned, the 
SPS Chapter mandates that relevant international documents play a 
major role in guiding national risk analysis.117  According to the 
WHO and FAO guidelines, the subject of risk communication 
involves multiple stakeholders, including risk assessors, risk 
managers, and external participants.118  Food authorities expect to 
form a unit with specialists responsible for communication, which 
could be integrated into “all phases of risk analysis” by their 
regulations.119  Indeed, many developed countries, including the 
CPTPP parties, have already implemented this task by setting up a 
specialized team for communication.120  
 
The WTO/SPS Agreement did not explicitly stipulate risk 
communication nor any requirements for the process.  However, 
Article 7 of the Agreement concerning transparency is a major 
mechanism by which the communication mandate can be 
fulfilled.121  WTO members are required to notify other members 
of their SPS measures and to keep them updated concerning 
 
115 CPTPP, supra note 18, art, 7.1, ¶ 2; see also FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, 
at 66; see also European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 13. 
116 See CPTPP, supra note 18. 
117 Id. art. 7.9, ¶¶ 2, 6(a). 
118 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 66. 
119 Id. (emphasis added).  
120 For example, the Japan Food Safety Commission is composed of seven 
commissioners, including one who has expertise in risk communication.  See, e.g., 
FOOD SAFETY COMMISSION OF JAPAN, fsc.go.jp/english/aboutus/members_com.html 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019).  
121 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7. 
2019]  SCIENCE & RISK ANALYSIS IN CPTPP/SPS-PLUS  41 
 
 
newly-implemented regulations. 122   Annex B, regarding 
transparency in the WTO/SPS Agreement, provides a more detailed 
process for communicating information.123  
 
Achieving greater transparency in the decision-making 
process has become a commonly-pursued agenda in current 
RTA/FTA negotiations.  Both the CETA124 and EPA125 aimed to 
improve the quality of transparency for SPS measures.  In terms of 
trade in agricultural products, the deficiency of transparency that 
constitutes a type of NTB has more direct and stronger effects than 
a tariff does.126  Thus, the efforts of the RTA were acclaimed 
because they were credited with “introducing new obligations that 
strengthen the ex-ante and ex-post transparency requirements 
related to the design and application of standards and establishing 
improved web-based information systems and consultation 
processes that include interested foreign parties.”127  
  
In line with the developments, the CPTPP SPS Chapter 
elaborates and enhances the level and contingency of 
transparency.128  An apparent discrepancy between the WTO SPS 
arrangement and that of the CPTPP is that the former largely entails 
one-way communication from national authorities to other 
members, whereas the latter strengthens mutual understanding and 
information exchange among governments and relevant 
stakeholders.   
 
The CPTPP Chapter also endeavors to improve the notice 
and comment procedure, which may strengthen the input of 
outward advice.  The attempt reflects the administrative practice129 
of the U.S. and was one of the main negotiation pieces put forward 
by the country. 130   The Chapter provides more stringent 
requirements on the time for comments and how the parties 
proposing SPS measures shall interact with their counter-parties.  
 
122 See id. 
123 See id. Annex B. 
124 CETA, supra note 8, ch. 5, arts. 5.11–5.12. 
125 Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, ch. 6, arts. 6.11, 6.12, 6.15; ch. 
17. 
126 See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 80–81. 
127 Id. at 80. 
128 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13. 
129 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 (2016); see also Wagner, supra 
note 29, at 464–65 (discussing the merits and problems of incorporating such a 
practice). 
130 See JOHNSON, supra note 28. 
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The WTO/SPS Agreement only requires a “reasonable” time for 
members to make comments.131  By contrast, the SPS Chapter 
specifies a fixed time of at least 60 days.132  
 
The methods of discussion and communication among 
parties under the CPTPP arrangements are relatively more proactive 
than reactive.133  The required exchanges are more comprehensive 
and meaningful.  WTO members must “discuss these comments 
upon request, and take the comments and the results of the 
discussions into account.”134  The SPS Chapter strengthens the 
interaction by adding that “on request of another Party, the Party 
shall respond to the written comments of the other Party in an 
appropriate manner.” 135   Because the SPS Agreement only 
requires members to exchange opinions on “comments,” the 
content of the discussion has also been elaborated in the Chapter to 
include “any scientific or trade concerns” raised by other parties 
and “the availability of alternative, less trade-restrictive approaches 
for achieving the objectives of the measure.”136    
 
If parties’ SPS measures are not in conformance with 
international standards, the SPS Chapter furthers the scope and 
content of the notification.  These countries are obliged to provide 
more thorough information, which has not been specified under the 
WTO agreement, such as documented and objective scientific 
evidence.137 
 
The SPS Agreement only suggests that WTO “members” 
can benefit from the merit of transparency.138  The CPTPP in 
particular aims to ensure that the general public is entitled to access 
the information in question, including the proposed measure, the 
legal basis for the measure, and the written comments received by 
the party.139  Therefore, if implemented appropriately, the design 
may help promote the realization of democratic decision-making by 
 
131 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d). 
132 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4. 
133 Ragnar E. Lofstedt, Risk versus Hazard—How to Regulate in the 21st Century, 
2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 149, 166-67 (2011) (describing how proactive risk 
communication can achieve better public trust compared to reactive 
communication). 
134 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d). 
135 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
136 Id. art. 7.13, ¶¶ 4, 7. 
137 Id. art. 7.13, ¶ 6. 
138 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶¶ 5, 6.  
139 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 5. 
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bound parties. 
 
The CPTPP’s approach is not entirely novel, but rather, 
reflects international and certain national practices.  Nevertheless, 
its progressiveness distinctive from the WTO SPS Agreement is 
quite obvious and meaningful.  The policy that places parties’ 
trading partners, interested persons, and the general public in 
beneficial positions may result in a more open, reasonable, 
non-arbitrary, and democratic decision-making process. 
 
IV.  Problems and Challenges with Implementing the 
SPS-Plus Requirements 
 
The SPS Chapter exhibits a strong intent to incorporate a 
risk analysis regime into national SPS regulations.  Requiring the 
provision of solid scientific evidence to justify their measures could 
impose considerable burdens on less developed countries.  Some 
of them may face difficulties in accessing the necessary science and 
technology.  They may not be able to comprehend recent relevant 
data.  It seems too onerous to expect them to have the same level 
of science and technology rigor as those CPTPP-developed parties.  
Given these scientific gaps, the implementation problem cannot be 
ignored.   
 
Many CPTPP parties that are strong in agricultural exports, 
such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, would benefit from 
importing countries making a real commitment to and enforcing 
science-based SPS measures.  These developed countries have 
already established relatively sound risk analysis regimes140 and 
may have no trouble implementing the mandate.141  Japan, which 
 
140 For example, Health Canada’s Food Directorate has a mandated responsibility 
to perform health risk assessments in response to requests from the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency as laid out in the Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements 
between Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. See, e.g., 
About Health Canada, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canad 
a/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/fo
od-directorate.html.  
141 The New Zealand government stated that “nothing in the SPS Chapter would 
require New Zealand to change our approach to protecting human health, 
maintaining food safety, and protecting New Zealand’s animal and plant health 
status from pests and diseases. As a result, there are no disadvantages to New 
Zealand entering CPTPP from an SPS perspective.” See, e.g., N.Z. FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS & TRADE, COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 33 (2018), 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/CPTPP-Final-National-Interest-Analysis-
8-March.pdf. 
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has tended to fill the leadership vacuum caused by the departure of 
the U.S., has confidence in ensuring compliance with the risk 
analysis standards.142      
 
Achieving the sound operation of a risk analysis regime 
always involves a costly and time-consuming process of capacity 
building.  Many less developed countries in this region may face 
hurdles in overcoming the challenges.  Moreover, some competent 
national food safety regimes have yet to mature.143  If little or no 
sound science can be produced to justify trade restrictions, these 
importing countries have little choice but to adhere to international 
standards 144  that may not always accommodate their specific 
public health concerns.  The high standard of the CPTPP may also 
dissuade countries from seeking accession to the agreement if the 
cost of compromising their policy freedom proves unaffordable.145  
 
All parties should work together to mitigate the problem of 
“technoimperialism,” that seeks to impose the high standards of 
developed countries upon less developed countries without 
meaningful input from the latter.146  Assisting these countries in 
adapting to the stricter regulatory requirements is also indispensable.  
International regulatory cooperation can play a critical role in 
promoting coherence and harmonization of regulations and 
practices among parties.147  Regarding risk assessment, regulatory 
cooperation can cover “dialogue, information sharing, and scientific 
fact-finding” and be fulfilled “by examining the science behind 
various regulatory approaches and determining which approach 
aligns with prevailing scientific knowledge.”148  Given that risk 
management is a relatively subjective process involving 
 
142 Interview with Japanese officials responsible for food safety on September 6, 
2016 (on file with the author).  
143 According to the USDA’s study, Vietnam’s “regulatory and food safety regime 
is still in its infancy and testing agencies are limited, leading to inconsistent 
enforcement which adds to uncertainty for foreign producers.” See U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., VIETNAM’S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 14 
(2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43899/49392_eib130.pdf? 
v=0.  
144 See CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2. 
145 Despite having signed the CPTPP, it remains unclear whether Malaysia may 
eventually ratify the agreement, and this is because the high standards may 
constrain its regulatory autonomy.  See Martin Khor, Should Malaysia Ratify the 
CPTPP Deal?, THE STRAITS TIMES, (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/ 
asia/se-asia/should-malaysia-ratify-the-cptpp-deal-the-star-columnist?.  
146 Marks, supra note 47, at 62–63 (illustrating that TPP may have fostered 
technoimperialism). 
147 Id. at 14–15.  
148 Id. at 45–46. 
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policy-making, regulatory cooperation may not necessarily be 
feasible.149  
 
The CPTPP does provide mechanisms to facilitate 
regulatory cooperation.  The SPS Chapter requires the 
establishment of a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures.150  Apart from enhancing the implementation of the 
Chapter, this Committee is tasked with promoting cooperation 
between parties through which information exchange can occur.  
However, the task of engaging in technical assistance and 
cooperation projects remains optional.151  Additionally, the CPTPP 
creates a new chapter on regulatory coherence in which regulatory 
cooperation and capacity building are given as mandates.152  A 
Committee on Regulatory Coherence will be established 153  to 
supervise regulatory cooperation 154  that “may” include 
“information exchanges, dialogues or meetings with other Parties 
and interested persons, training programmes and relevant assistance, 
and other activities between regulatory agencies.”155  It remains to 
be seen whether the soft commitment to technical and other 
substantial support can effectively relieve the less developed 
countries’ burden.      
         
Overall, the CPTPP’s ambition to optimize national SPS 
regulations cannot be fulfilled without genuine collaboration, 
experience-sharing, and technological and financial assistance.156  
The full realization of the SPS-plus goals will, to some extent, 
depend on the goodwill and actions of the CPTPP parties that 
possess sufficient capacities. 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks  
The requirement for building a sound risk analysis regime 
is indicative of the CPTPP’s pursuit of high standards in food safety 
 
149 Id. at 45–47. 
150 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.5, ¶ 1. 
151 Id. art. 7.5, ¶ 3(e). 
152 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.2, ¶¶ 1, 2(e); see also Marks, supra note 47, at 
58 (stating that the CPTPP is the first trade agreement to include regulatory 
coherence). 
153 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.6, ¶ 1. 
154 Id. art. 25.6, ¶¶ 2, 4; art. 25.9, ¶¶ 1, 4. 
155 Id. art. 25.7, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
156 See, e.g., Phoenix X. F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization 
Mechanisms in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 505, 
537-38 (2016) (observing that the efforts of capacity building can ensure the 
success of regulatory coherence and cooperation).   
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regulations.  The substance of the risk analysis is a blend of WTO 
jurisprudence, international standards, and national practices, 
especially those of the U.S.  Observing how this RTA’s proposed 
mechanism may interact with the relevant law-making of the WTO 
and thus enable the multilateralization of RTA-plus is appealing.157  
The influence of CPTPP’s model of risk analysis could be strong 
upon the parties’ will to cooperate and act in good faith.   
This lofty regulatory requirement may not be difficult to 
meet for some parties, such as Japan, Australia, and Canada.  
However, given the complexity of the system and the necessity for 
major capacity building and interdisciplinary professions, it would 
be undesirable for less developed countries to be required to attain 
the same level as countries that have substantial experience and 
practice in this regard.   
The requirement of scientific risk assessment does raise the 
level for admissible scientific evidence.  It would place the science 
used by the parties under scrutiny.  Nonetheless, the credibility of 
scientific findings would not be subject to dispute settlement under 
the CPTPP, which can thus reduce the pressure on the parties, 
leaving them some leeway vis-à-vis regulatory space and autonomy.   
Many Asian countries face the challenge of balancing the 
promotion of food trade with the protection of citizens from the 
risks engendered by imported food.  For example, Korea and 
Taiwan have prohibited the import of potentially radioactive foods 
from Fukushima, Japan, for many years.  Although the food risks 
have gradually decreased, those countries are still hesitant to lift the 
ban, and this is not necessarily only because of health concerns but 
also for social or political reasons.  However, if the risk analysis 
system can fairly be incorporated into domestic regimes, it may 
allow countries to construct a better mechanism that streamlines 
decision-making based on scientific evidence and public 
participation rather than yields to political interests. 
The CPTPP risk analysis approach may provide momentum 
to rationalize and democratize national food safety regulatory 
regimes.  However, it may also restrict importing countries’ 
autonomy for food regulations, forcing them to stick to mainstream 
science-based standards normally evidenced in international 
agreements and practice.  This article has argued that the extension 
 
157 See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 76–77, 81 (arguing that the trend of 
RTA-plus, especially in the agricultural sector, is expected to be multilteralized, 
but conceding that it may be subject to political will). 
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of good faith technical and capacity-building support from 
developed parties and full commitments to regulatory cooperation 
may alleviate difficulties in compliance. 
